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Abstract. Nowadays, safety-critical systems are used in various do-
mains including Internet of Things of medical devices. However, such
systems are usually very complex and fault-prone. This means, safety,
security and real-time aspects are often only insufficiently considered.
To mitigate or avoid safety-critical failures, it is mandatory to analyze
effects by means of a failure and change impact analysis. In this paper,
we propose an approach to analyze a hierarchical structured model to
determine critical goals. Afterwards, the effects and impacts of failures
are calculated and determined to identify components which have a need
of counter measures. Furthermore, it is analyzed which kind of effects
these counter measures will have within the hierarchical model. Finally,
the developed approach is evaluated by means of a realistic medical use
case.
Keywords: Impact Analysis · Risk Assessment · Safety-Critical System.
1 Introduction
The level of complexity in IT systems is rising constantly. Therefore, these sys-
tems are also getting more complicated and hardly manageable. However, if there
is a safety-critical system, like in automotive or medical field, e.g., to guarantee
the airbag triggering or the correct administration of drugs, humans or assets,
like data, can be endangered if the systems was not controlled. As 50% of flaws
happen in the design phase [18] an identification and elimination of safety and
security vulnerabilities at an early stage is essential. However, it is not enough
to identify potential failures as weak points can be complex and have impacts
on other components or relations too. To remove or mitigate the weak points
components with a need of counter measures (CMs) have to be identified as
well. As existing approaches do not combine the identification of weak points,
the impacts of failures and the subsequent determination of CMs, we developed
a holistic process to increase the safety of safety-critical systems. To address
the aforementioned issues our approach identifies critical elements in an archi-
tecture model by the usage and adaptation of architecture analysis approaches
which enable not only to identify flaws, but also their impacts and needs of CMs.
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Therefore, we developed an approach which uses a safety goal hierarchy (SGH)
combined with FMEA to identify weak points and conduct a failure impact anal-
ysis (FIA) to determine failure effects. Following, architectural changes will be
recognized through a change impact analysis (CIA). The paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 contains related work for failure and change impacts as well
as safety-critical systems. Afterwards needed basics of Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA), Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) and dependencies between
safety and security are presented. Section 4 describes the approach in 4 detailed
steps, which are evaluated in Section 5 with aid of a medical smart home use
case. A conclusion and outlook are given in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There are numerous projects and scientific publications with respect to FIA and
CIA as well as safety-critical systems, which are presented hereinafter.
2.1 Failure and Change Impacts
The work of Langermeier et al. [10] provides a CIA approach based on Enter-
prise Architecture Models. By means of their approach, which is based on a
data-flow analysis technique, it is analyzed which model elements are affected.
The algorithm of the authors aims to apply a CIA in context of Enterprise Ar-
chitecture Models. However, our paper proposes an approach how to apply FIA
and CIA taken safety-critical concerns like, e.g., safety and security into account.
[16] propose an Eclipse based tool named Chianti and analyzes change impacts
of regression or unit tests. By means of the execution behavior a set of affected
changes is determined for each affected test. Chianti does not analyze change
impacts on models but on Java code. Such as [10], Ren et al. [16] don’t consider
safety-critical aspects in their approach in order to enable a maximum degree
of safety and security by means of the CIA. The paper of Hanemann et al. [5]
dealing with resource failures, which might endanger service level agreements
by influencing services. Therefore, [5] presents an approach, which identifies the
effect of resource failures with respect to the corresponding services and service
level agreements. In addition to those effects, a technique is proposed in order
to improve services and to provide them. Such as [10] and [16], Hanemann et. al
[5] also do not take safety-critical issues into account. In summary, each of the
presented scientific publications provide either a FIA or a CIA but there is no
combination of them. Furthermore, all publications do not consider the topic of
safety-critical systems.
2.2 Safety-Critical Systems
For instance, there is a project, which is called SESAMO (Security and Safety
Modelling) and focuses on safety and security requirements, aiming “to develop
a component-oriented design methodology based upon model-driven technology,
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jointly addressing safety and security aspects and their interrelation for net-
worked embedded systems in multiple domains” [1]. This project focuses on
identifying safety and security hazards in order to calculate a trade-off between
contradicting safety and security issues. Furthermore, another project concern-
ing safety is called SafeCer (Safety Certification of Software-Intensive Systems
with Reusable Components). The purpose of this project is to increase “[...] effi-
ciency and reduce(d) time-to-market by composable safety certification of safety-
relevant embedded systems.” [9] The main focus of this project is to provide a
procedure of composing safety arguments for a system by reusing of already
certificated arguments of subsystems. In this way, it enhances efficient safety
assurance and certification. Furthermore, there is the work of Lohmüller et al.
[12], which proposes an approach for calculating trade-offs between contradict-
ing safety-critical concerns. These include safety, security and timing. However,
it aims to guarantee an optimal solution, which is as safe as possible. When
comparing these works, one will realize that all of them cover safety and secu-
rity. The work of [1] and [12] even combines safety with security or security and
timing. In contrast to this paper, no scientific work integrates a FIA or CIA in
their approaches.
So far, it has not been scientifically evaluated how to combine the results of a
FIA with a CIA in context of safety-critical systems. Therefore, the approach,
which will be presented in this paper, is innovative.
3 Basics
Following, essential basics for the concept of this paper will be presented. These
include the FMEA, BBN and the interplay between safety and security.
3.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Nowadays, the software development process in context of safety-critical systems
requires risk assessment. The FMEA is a widely used and established technique
and is applied in different domains like, e.g., medical information science, auto-
motive, avionics and railway industry. It is purpose of the FMEA to mitigate
risks as much as possible. This is done by detecting and preventing failures. For
the failure prevention, it is essential to indicate and to prevent failures in early
stages of product cycle. The later a failure will be indicated the more expensive
the development costs. Accordingly, the costs will increase about 10 times for
each posterior stage [2]. The failure detection has four essential goals:
1. Detection of possible fault sources, which can cause failures
2. All causes and consequences must be identified, mitigated or avoided
3. Faultless organization of process during the development cycle
4. Vulnerabilities of the system, products or processes must be identified in
order that a constructive revision can be performed
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To prevent and detect failures it is necessary to determine potential risks by
means of the FMEA. whereas occurrence complies with the probability whether
a hazard occurs. Severity corresponds to the severity of hazard. The detection
complies with the probability that a hazard will be detected. Each of the three
factors can range between 1 and 10, i.e., the RPN can range between 1 and 1000.
In general, the lower the RPN the better the potential risk. Depending on the
value of the RPN, the degree of risk and the necessity of CMs can be identified
by means of Table 1. [2]
RPN Risk of Error Counter Measure
RPN = 1 none no CMs required
2 ≤ RPN ≤ 50 acceptable additional warning required
50 < RPN ≤ 250 medium additional protective CMs required
250 < RPN ≤ 1000 high constructive CMs absolutely required
Table 1. Interpretation of the RPN [3]
3.2 Bayesian Belief Networks
BBN are highly complex networks which represent the probabilities of condi-
tional dependencies of variables. Many research approaches of plenty research
fields used or described BBN, e.g., [8], [17] or [4]. As a detailed description is out
of scope in this paper, the most important parts are described afterwards. The
formulas and theorems are abstracted from [14]. BBN are probabilistic, graphical
models which are used to represent and calculate the conditional probabilities
of model elements. Important characteristics are directed and acyclic relations,
random variables with discrete states and dependencies to ancestor and descen-
dant nodes. These networks are not restricted to a specific field. The majority
of use cases for BBN are networks with questions about dependent probabilities
of nodes with different possible states, e.g., the determination of correctness of
a disease test. To determine the corresponding conditional probability distribu-
tion of every node in the graph a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) has to
be defined. This table contains all possible combinations of the diverse states of
ancestor nodes to determine the probability of these combinations. Depending
on the leading question a model can be analyzed with different approaches and
formulas. However, these are the required formulas of our approach:
Bayesian Theorem: P (B|A) = P (A|B) ∗ P (B)/P (A)
Conditional Independencies: P (AB) = P (A) ∗ P (B)
Markov Assumption/Joint Probability: P (X) =
∏n
i=1 P (Xi|ancestor(Xi))
3.3 Influences of Security on Safety
Nowadays, it is possible that security violates safety aspects. The following exam-
ple from the past demonstrates this scenario in more detail. Due to the terrorist
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attacks of September 11th, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City
it has been decided to perform stricter security measures. Given the fact that
the airplanes from the terrorist attacks has been hijacked a security measure has
been introduced that the access to the cockpit is denied during the flight. This
security precaution became an obstacle for the Germanwings flight 4U9525 on
March 24th, 2015, which crashed in the French Alps. The captain within the
cockpit has full control over the door and can even inhibit emergency access.
Based on voice records, the co-pilot is suspected of deliberately destroying the
plane while preventing the captain from reentering the cockpit. This means, in-
creasing security against hijackers intensified reliance on the pilot being left on
his one and carrying full responsibility for flying the airplane [19]. As demon-
strated by this example, security has decisive impacts on safety.
4 Concept
After presenting related work and required basics we introduce our impact ap-
proach. The concept is based on diverse architecture analysis approaches, which
are mighty tools in the design phase of system development. These kinds of
analyses can check different aspects depending on the application field and the
leading question of analysis. One field is Enterprise Architecture Management
(EAM), which uses the analyses to outline and check coherences of business
components, relations and processes. [15] provides an overview and classification
of these analysis types with their several aims and techniques.
The concept of this paper is subdivided into four essential steps, which are
presented in Figure 1. First, it is necessary to define a SGH in order to model
safety-critical matters and to take trade-offs into account. On the basis of this
SGH, potential failures will be identified by applying the FMEA. Step 3 conducts
a FIA to determine impacts and effects of these potential failures and aims
in identifying components which requires CMs. However, applying new CMs
involve modifying other goals within the SGH. These goals will be identified
and the effect types are determined. The following subsections will cover the
aforementioned steps in more detail.
Failure and Change Impact Analysis - Concept
Step 1: Create SGH to model safety-critical matters
Step 3: Determine effects of failure events and the need of 
CMs by means of FIA
Step 4: Calculate change impacts of CMs
Step 2: Identify potential failures by means of FMEA
Fig. 1. Concept Picture of the Approach
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4.1 Modeling SGH
The SGH (cf. Figure 2) is a hierarchical structure, i.e., there must be a root goal,
which represents a safety aspect like, e.g., a system or a part of is acceptably safe.
The root goal is refined by further safety-critical concerns, which influence the
safety of this goal. These include, e.g., security or timing. Goals, which cannot
be refined anymore are called Point of Vulnerabilities (POVs) and thus represent
vulnerabilities of a system. Goals and POVs must accomplish quality attributes,
i.e., they are annotated with attributes including a valid range of values. For
instance, the goal Airbag triggers in time should be annotated with attribute
triggerTime and range of values 0 < triggerTime ≤ 100ms. In safety-critical
System is acc. safe
Subgoal 2 Subgoal 3Subgoal 1

























Fig. 2. Basic Structure of a SGH Supporting Three Alternative Solutions
systems there is a number of hardware components or software components in-
stalled, which have different safety requirements than other components, i.e., an
individual component set must be defined for which the SGH should be applied.
In this context, we speak about alternative solutions. Each of the alternative
solutions accords with the aforementioned POV to a different extent.
4.2 Identifying Failures
The focus of this subsection is to asses risk of POVs in consideration of alterna-
tive solutions. Ideally, all POVs of a SGH should be prevented by the individual
alternative solutions. However, in practice it is not compulsory possible, since
the individual components of an alternative solution are not always in harmony
with all POVs. To identify the failures, it is necessary to determine the RPN
values (cf. Section 3.1) of the individual POVs depending on the corresponding
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alternative solutions. This means in particular that we first need the probabili-
ties of occurrence, severity and detection in order to finally determine the RPN
assessments of them (cf. Section 3.1). Subsequently, it is necessary to classify
the resulting RPN according to Table 1. If there is a risk of error classified with
medium or high, i.e., 50 ≤ RPN ≤ 1000 it is mandatory to identify the re-
lated elements with a need of corresponding CMs, which will be described in
Section 4.3.
4.3 Failure Impact Analysis
After the identification of a potential failure we have to analyze the impacts on
other elements. Since we already know the theoretical causal relation of a failure
we do not have to analyze our system top-down. Therefore, we have to apply a
bottom-up approach to monitor effects on elements which are logical dependent
on the faulty element. Components which are highly negative affected by the
failure have to be adapted by CMs. Architecture analyses are a possibility to
identify these elements. As described above, EAM already uses these analyses
successfully what yields us to conduct a concept transfer of a FIA approach by
[6]. However, a few important aspects have to be changed to make the approach
suitable for safety-critical systems. The most important change is the type of
leading question for analysis as [6] analyzing their system top-down. Therefore,
we need to shift metrics, variables, tools and use other BBN formulas.
Our FIA approach is divided in 5 (A-E) steps to clarify the execution of the
analysis:
(A) A graphical representation of the whole system or of a specific process/service
is required. To model our system we adapted on ArchiMate version 3.0.1 since
it is an updated version with elements for Internet of Things (IoT) systems,
which are kinds of safety-critical systems. Therefore, we distinguish between ac-
tive/passive structure elements and behavioral elements for the representation
of nodes. In addition, there are 11 relation types categorized in 4 classes which
address diverse connections concerning structure, dependency and other aspects.
Depending on the use case different layered approaches can be used. Exemplary,
a layered architecture approach for IoT is presented in Figure 3. This approach
differs strongly from EAM layers as IoT systems have other features like open-
ness, flexibility, connection of autonomous devices with each other to measure
and send data, etc. The presented layered approach is based on [13] and [7] and
consists of 8 layers.
(B) Before mapping the model into a BBN model an analysis attribute, e.g.,
availability, has to be chosen. Depending on this attribute the BBN relations
respectively dependencies can be determined.
(C) Translation of the model into a BBN structure to enable the modeling of
probabilistic dependencies and the prediction capabilities. To transform the sys-
tem model we conduct two sub-steps. First, we map every system element into a
BBN node, i.e., variable. Thereby, all different kinds of element types transform
and remain in the same layer. However, if an element is not involved into the
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Fig. 3. Layered Architecture for IoT Systems
dependency structure it will be excluded. Secondly, the relation transformation
has to be conducted depending on the attribute defined in (B). Every system
relation is mapped to a causal BBN relation. Attention should be paid to the
BBN characteristics presented in Section 3.2. Therefore, all acyclic or undirected
relations of the system model have to be deleted or modified.
(D) Discretization of variables and determination of CPTs. As every BBN node
represents a variable the variables’ attributes get discretized and the correspond-
ing probabilities are determined, e.g., a node Weather has the discrete attribute
states with probabilities ”Sunny=95%” and ”Rainy=5%”. Afterwards, the CPTs
of every variable have to be defined including all possible combinations of the
node’s parents. This can be conducted by expert interviews, estimations or his-
torical data analysis. To identify the impact of a failure we have to determine
the nodes’ probabilities before the occurrence of the failure. If causes of a failure
have to be identified the Bayesian Theorem is used. However, if impacts of a
failure are the focus of the analysis the Joint Probability formula is used with
CPT values to identify the conditional probability of effects spreading out to the
node.
(E) Calculation of impacts and determination of point for CM application. After
the determination of the BBN model including probability states the failure is
simulated and the probability of the faulty node is set accordingly. Consequently,
the CPTs and probabilities of the BBN model have to be updated. The update
can be conducted through new interviews or statistical calculations. Following
this, a delta of probabilities of the nodes, before and after the failure, emerges
which represents the impacts. This delta has to be evaluated by experts or a
predefined scale, which divides the impacts into categories. Elements in a cat-
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egory of highly negative impact triggered by failures need CMs. As a last step
the most affected layer can be identified.
4.4 Change Impact Analysis
Assuming that experts have realized CMs in the last step, a CIA is needed to
analyze which kind of effects necessary CMs will have. As a CM can require new
nodes or the elimination of nodes, i.e., the SGH requires an update. Only an
updated SGH can be used to evaluate the new safety-as-is status of an model in
the future. First, it must be clarified which node types of the SGH are affected
by the CIA and in which direction (top-down ↓ or bottom-up ↑) the impacts will
be propagandized:
1. Goal → Goal: ↓↑
2. Goal → POV: ↓
3. POV → Goal: ↑
4. POV → Alternative Solution: ↓
This means, that an amendment of a goal can have both impacts on goals with
higher abstraction level and goals with lower abstraction level. Moreover, POVs
are involved as well. Modifications regarding POVs will affect goals on the next
overlying layer. Furthermore, amendments of the POVs directly influence the
alternative solutions. To perform the CIA step by step we need impact rules [10]
with the following syntax:
A.X → B.Y
In general, this statement expresses if source element A has the characteristic
X, it follows that target element B has the characteristic Y. Concretely, this
implies A ∈ {Goal, POV } and B ∈ A ∪ {AlternativeSolution}. The opera-
tions or effects, which are represented by X and Y are defined as follows: X,Y
∈ {noEffect, extend,modify, delete}. Extending a SGH element means to re-
fine an element, e.g., by adding new elements. If an element is modified, the
necessary information will be updated. Deleting a SGH element implies to re-
move it from the SGH. For instance, if the impact rule G1.modify→ G2.extend
is applied, it means that G1 will be modified and, in this regard G2 must be
extended as an impact. In this paper, we distinguish between Best-Case (BC)
and Worst-Case (WC) CIA. The first one requires a minimum number of change
impacts or lightweight change impacts and vice versa for the WC analysis. In the
following, we define the change impact rules for the SGH, split into BC and WC
(cf. Table 2). Hereinafter, the WC rules are explained in more detail. In case
of deleting, modifying or extending a goal, the underlying goal or POV must
deleted, modified or extended as well. Furthermore, if a goal or POV is deleted,
modified or extended the overlying goal must be modified in each case since in-
formation of the child nodes must be transmitted onto the corresponding parent
node. The consequence of amendments on POVs is modifying all concerned al-
ternative solutions. This can be justified by the fact that solutions directly and
only depend on the POVs.
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Table 2. Change Impact Rules
Algorithm 1 Change Impact Analysis
1: procedure ChangeImpactAnalysis(node, operation)
2: if node isTypeOf Goal then
3: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(node, getParentGoal(node), operation) then
4: changeImpactAnalysis(g, getEffectType(node, operation))
5: end if
6: for all cg ∈ childGoals do
7: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(node, cg, operation) then
8: changeImpactAnalysis(g, getEffectType(node, operation))
9: end if
10: end for
11: for all pov ∈ POV s do
12: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(node, pov, operation) then




17: if checkPrefAndApplyRule(node, getParentGoal(node), operation) then
18: changeImpactAnalysis(g, getEffectType(node, operation))
19: end if
20: for all s ∈ solutions do




So far, it was not specified to what extent the rules must be applied. Therefore,
an algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1) is needed to consider this. The CIA is started
initially by means of an impact rule according to Table 2. Subsequently, it is
performed recursively until no more rules can be applied. Since the effects of
some goals, POVs or solutions would be set multiple it is mandatory to define
preferences of the effects types depending on BC or WC calculation. In case of
BC the preferences are defined as delete P modify P extend whereas for
WC the preferences are defined as follows: extend P modify P delete. This
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is due to the fact that it is more complex to extend a node more as to delete
it. The resulting set of nodes including effect types, which must be enhanced by
applying Algorithm 1 is defined as ACI . So far, ACI only consider the hierar-
chical structure of the SGH, but not any semantics within the SGH. Therefore,
we also need the attributation within the SGH as proposed in Section 4.1. If the
constraints of an attribute are violated because of invalid values, the SGH must
be browsed for nodes with the same attributes and range of values. The set of all
matches within the SGH is defined as BCI . The final result of the CIA CCI , i.e.,
the set of nodes which are affected by the violation of any constraints is defined
as follows: CCI = ACI ∩BCI .
5 Evaluation
After presenting the steps of our approach we conduct the evaluation with aid
of a medical use case. As mentioned before IoT is a kind of safety-critical system
if devices with safety goals are included, like IoT of medical devices or medical
smart homes. Therefore, we use a system for Ambient Assisted Living (AAL)
to evaluate our approach. Figure 4 depicts an exemplary AAL system with 4
medical or wellbeing devices delivering health support. As it exceeds the scope
of our evaluation, just a small cutout of the system is shown and only 5 layers of
the presented layered architecture in Section 4.3 are visible. The devices include
sensors, actuators or RFID tags to measure and to trigger actions. For instance,
the insulin pump measures data which are sent to the IoT-Hub which reviews




















































Fig. 4. AAL Use Case - Medical Smart Home
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Step 1 and 2: First, we need to create a SGH (cf. Figure 5) representing an
AAL, which is acceptably safe. For this purpose, the root node AAL is acceptably
safe representing a safety goal is mandatory. The AAL SGH is further refined
in consideration of the following context: For the success of an AAL system
correctly functioning of the AAL sensors is a prerequisite, e.g., insulin pump
sensors. Furthermore, AAL actuators must work correctly, e.g., activating pill-
box. Moreover, the software running on an AAL system must work correctly.
To ensure this, results of calculations must be correct and be performed in time
without any delay. In addition, software must be acceptably secure against third
party hacking attacks. The fourth aspect, which has been taken into account is
the reliability of the AAL communication. For this purpose, the system must be
secured against data theft and manipulation. Moreover, messages must be cor-
rectly transferred in time. As mentioned in Section 4.1 all nodes within the SGH
must be annotated with an attribute. These attributes will be described in detail
in step 4. The SGH of the AAL use case is extended by two alternative solutions.
(1) AAL is 
acceptably safe
(4) The probability of 
detecting a fall event 
in time is acceptable
48 40
(2) AAL sensors are 
working correctly 
(6) AAL actuators are 
working correctly





(3) Insulin measure is 
acceptably accurate
48 48




(8) Fall detection 
actuator failure is 
sufficiently mitigated
200 192(5) Insulin pump 
sensor failure is 
sufficiently mitigated
84 63
(9) Pillbox actuator 
failure is sufficiently 
mitigated
30 30
(11) Results are 
correct. Errors are 
sufficiently mitigated.
36 36
(12) Results are 














is acceptably secured 
against manipulation
48 42
(17) Messages arrive 
in time with 
acceptable reliability
40 48





(19) 128 bit 
encryption 
algorithm 
(20) 256 bit 
encryption 
algorithm
Fig. 5. AAL Use Case - SGH
In this use case, the SGH is applied for one of the following configurations:
1. 128 bit encryption algorithm
2. 256 bit encryption algorithm
Subsequently, the FMEA is performed as described in Section 4.2. In this context,
it is essential to determine the corresponding RPNs of the POVs with regard
to the individual alternative solutions. If there is a RPN classified with medium
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or high risk of error (cf. Table 1) corresponding CMs are necessary. This affects
two of the POVs: Insulin pump sensor failure is sufficiently mitigated, rated with
a RPN of 84 or 63 and Fall detection actuator failure is sufficiently mitigated,
which is rated with 200 or 192. An insulin pump sensor failure means that blood
glucose level cannot be measured correctly. If the fall detection actuator fails,
the SOS call cannot be performed.
Step 3: As the FMEA results yield potential failures in two nodes we have to
check these nodes for impacts in case of a failure to be able to identify elements
with a need of CMs. In the following case we merely inspect the failure event of
node Sensor of the insulin pump. The FIA is conducted with the steps described
in Section 4.3.
(A) The graphical representation of our use case is already shown in Figure 4
including different kinds of element and relation types of an AAL.
(B) As described, we need to choose an analysis attribute to be able to map the
system into the BBN model accurately. As the diverse nodes can have multiple
attributes we have to elect an attribute which is most suitable for the predictive
leading analysis question. As we want to spot the impact of a failure of a data
measuring node we decide to choose data quality as the analysis attribute. We
define data quality as a combination of reliability, accurate amount of data mea-
sure sets and data intervals. To simplify the next step and the whole analysis we
constrain data quality to correct data intervals as a irregular measurement can
lead to faulty results.
(C) After having chosen the attribute we conduct the BBN mapping. At first,
we map the system nodes into BBN nodes. In this use case we are able to trans-
fer every element to a BBN node except the Data Object. This element has no
dependencies for data intervals. Afterwards, we map the system relations into
BBN relations. Hereby, we have to keep in mind the chosen analysis attribute
as the conditional BBN relations can vary depending on the attribute. As this
use case is highly dependent on data measurement we are able to transfer every
directed relation. However, only some undirected relations could be modified and
mapped. Figure 6 presents, i.a., the results of the mapping step.
(D) To determine the probabilities we have to discretize our analysis attribute
data quality. As we consider the timing aspect of data quality we discretize the
variables with the states ”Up” for accomplishing the data interval and ”Down”
for contravening the interval. Afterwards, every node, i.e. variable, is assigned
its own probability for both states. Once, the probabilities are set the CPTs
are determined for every node depending on the combinations of their ancestor
states. For instance, the probabilities of the insulin pump are ”Up=60%” and
”Down=40%” as well as ”Up=45%” and ”Down=55%” for the wearable. Table 3
shows a exemplary CPT of the IoT Hub. To be able to simulate the model ran-
dom numbers were chosen for this use case. The scope of Figure 6 impeded the
illustration of all probabilities and CPTs on the according nodes.
(E) As a last step we want to identify the impacts of the insulin pump sen-
sor failure. As the probabilities before the failure event are already determined
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Insulin Pump Wearable U D
U U 0.9 0.1
D D 0,01 0,99
U D 0,4 0,6
D U 0,3 0,7
Table 3. CPT Example
we can simulate the failure now by setting the probability of the sensor on
”Down=100%”. Accordingly, all nodes which depend on the sensor have to up-
date their probability and CPTs. Therefor, the Joint Probability formula by
multiplying the CPTs is used. Afterwards, the delta of probabilities before and
after the failure event can be identified. We present an exemplary impact iden-
tification on the nodes Measurement Service and Connection Management. For
instance, Figure 6 displays the faulty sensor and the probabilities of both nodes
for the attribute data quality before and after the failure. Since both nodes are
negatively affected which leads to deterioration of more than 40%, both nodes
need CMs to be prepared in case of a failure.
After the identification of effected nodes we have to transfer the knowledge to



































Sensing Mgmt Data Mgmt
Smartphone
Data Quality Con. Mgmt
UP: 92% -> 42%
DOWN: 8% -> 58%
Data Quality Meas. Service
UP: 78% -> 35%
DOWN: 10% -> 65%
Fig. 6. BBN after Model Mapping with conducted analysis results
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Step 4: Deductive to step 3, there is a CM necessary for the POV Messages
arrive in time with acceptable reliability. However, it must be checked if there
are further nodes within the SGH, which must be amended as well. Therefore,
we need to apply the change impact rules according to Table 2. First, we have
to check for the nodes’ attributes which were annotated in step 1 and 2. Since
we examine within this evaluation data quality, we annotated the corresponding
nodes within the SGH with a suitable attribute. To match the analysis attribute
data quality we use the node attribute timeLimit for the POVs Results are cal-
culated in time. Delays are sufficiently mitigated. and Messages arrive in time
with acceptable reliability as well as for the solutions 128 bit encryption algorithm
and 256 bit encryption algorithm. Each of them are tagged with timeLimit=200,
i.e., there is a maximum time limit of 200 ms in order to achieve the goals.
In this use case, we consider the WC scenario, i.e., ACI = {1, ..., 20} and BCI =
{12, 17, 19, 20}. The entire sequence of change impact rules (necessary for ACI)
for this use case is listed in Table 4. According to Section 4.4 CCI = ACI ∩
BCI , i.e., CCI = {12, 17, 19, 20} since these nodes are also annotated with the
corresponding timeLimit attribute. In summary, POV #17 from which the CIA
has been started must be either deleted, modified or extended depending on CM
action of #17. In addition, goal #12 and the solutions #19 and #20 must be
modified. The CIA of this use case explicitly considers the specified time limit.
When amending timing-critical goals or POVs, reliability is also fulfilled since
messages arrive in time or calculations are performed in time. In this way, the
desired number of messages or calculations can be done within a specified time
limit.
delete modify extend








Table 4. AAL Use Case - Sequence of Change Impact Rules (WC)
In summary, we analyzed a medical AAL system for potential failures, their
impacts and effects of realized CMs.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, an approach has been presented in order to perform a FIA and
a CIA in context of safety-critical systems, which has been demonstrated for
16 P. Lohmüller et al.
a medical use case. For this purpose some prerequisites must be met: An at-
tributed SGH is required with subsequent FMEA analysis to identify potential
failures. Afterwards, the impact of a failure event have been identified including
the need of CMs by the usage of a FIA. Finally, we examine the effects of CMs
through applying the change impact rules of the CIA. Due to the complexity
of safety-critical systems, the utilization of impact analyses during design phase
is becoming increasingly important. For future work, it might be useful to au-
tomatize some processes of this approach in order to renounce expert knowledge.
These include, e.g., automation of CPT or a semantical analysis within the SGH.
Furthermore, it might be useful to extend the approach of this paper by software
product lines as used in [11].
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